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Downside Systematic Risk in Australian Listed Property Trusts 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Previous studies on systematic risk have demonstrated the link between financial and 
management structure determinants and systematic risk. However, systematic risk is 
estimated by assuming return is normally distributed. This assumption is generally 
rejected for real estate returns. Therefore, downside systematic risk appears as a more 
sensible risk measure in estimating market-related risk. This study contributes to this 
body of knowledge by examining the determinants of downside systematic risk in 
Australian Listed Property Trusts (LPTs) over 1993-2005. The results reveal that 
systematic risk and downside systematic risk are empirically distinguishable. More 
specifically, there is limited evidence on the connection between these financial and 
management structure determinants and systematic risk. However, downside 
systematic risk is sensitive to leverage and management structure.   
 
Keywords: downside systematic risk, financial determinants, management structure, 
listed property trusts 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Investment in Listed Property Trusts (LPTs) or Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 
has traditionally considered risk as an important factor particularly systematic risk. 
Numerous studies on systematic risk in the literature have also demonstrated that 
LPT’s financial condition and management structure have implications for its 
systematic risk. Most of these studies have utilised the cross-sectional difference of 
LPT financial conditions and LPT management structure in estimating the 
relationship between these variables and systematic risk. A LPT’s systematic risk is 
measured by the beta coefficient in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in which 
it is measured in a variance framework.  
 
However, the appropriateness of using CAPM in particular the use of beta as 
systematic risk measure has been debated in recent years (see Section 2.2). In fact, 
several studies suggest using downside systematic risk (downside beta) rather than 
systematic risk for measuring market-related risk for an asset in line with the 
theoretical superiorities of downside risk. Downside risk was first introduced by Roy 
(1952) based on the safety first rule. It appears as a more intuitively appealing risk 
measure compared to variance for several reasons such as downside risk does not 
require an assumption about the return distribution of an asset; it is more consistent 
with the investor’s expected utility function and combining information provided by 
variance and skewness into one measure (Nawrocki, 1999, Estrada, 2002).  
 
Hogan and Warren (1974) and Bawa and Linderberg (1977) also demonstrated that 
downside risk (lower partial moment) can be generalised into CAPM and they 
developed a Mean-lower Partial Moment Capital Asset Pricing Model (MLPM-
CAPM). More importantly, the results from Price et al. (1982) and Nantell et al. (1982) 
depicted that if the return distributions are not normally distributed, downside 
systematic risk is different from traditional systematic risk.  
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In real estate field, downside risk has also received some attention and it was only 
introduced to real estate in late 1990s by Sivitanides (1998) and Sing and Ong (2000). 
Both of studies revealed that downside risk produces divergence portfolio allocations 
in comparison with the mean-variance portfolio. This was confirmed by the findings 
from Byrne and Lee (2004) for U.K. real estate portfolios, and Peng (2005) for 
Australian real estate portfolio allocations. More importantly, Cheng (2001) argued 
that bootstrapped simulated downside risk model provided a more realistic allocation 
for real estate.  
 
However, the question of downside systematic risk in LPTs has been the subject of 
relatively little research. As a consequence, the aim of this paper is to address this gap 
in the literature by examining the downside systematic risk in Australian LPTs. The 
investigation is furthered by examining the differences in the sensitivities of 
systematic risk and downside systematic risk to the LPT’s financial conditions and its 
management structure.      
 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the connection 
between financial determinants and management structure and systematic risk. The 
importance of downside systematic risk is also reviewed in Section 2. The data and 
methodology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 reports on and discusses the 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.    
 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section contains 2 parts. The first part focuses on a review on the determinants of 
systematic risk in real estate. The second part reviews the importance and advantages 
of MLPM-CAPM in estimating systematic risk.  
     
2.1 Systematic Risk and its Determinants 
 
In recent years, several studies on systematic risk have demonstrated the association 
between systematic risk of a LPT with the market-related risk and its financial 
conditions. Patel and Olsen (1984) is probably the first study in the real estate context, 
utilised a small sample size of U.S. REITs from 1976 to 1978 and provided evidence 
that short-term financial leverage, business risk and the advisor fee of a LPT are 
directly related to its systematic risk.  
 
More recently, Delcoure and Dickens (2004) extended their study by employing a 
larger sample size of U.S. REITs. The results indicated that business risk is 
significantly and negatively related to the REIT systematic risk in all models while 
there are no similar significant results for marketability and agency variables. 
Additionally, they found an inverse relationship between REIT systematic risk and 
short term and variable-rate financing; while a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between long-term debt and REIT systematic risk. Consistently, Allen et 
al. (2000) also found a positive and significant relationship between total financial 
leverage and systematic risk. Besides, Allen et al. (2000) also confirmed the findings 
of Patel and Olsen (1984) in which the asset variable (the proportion of the REIT 
invested in equity real estate) is insignificant in explaining beta. They also showed 
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that specialisation (the total of the squared proportions of the REIT’s portfolio 
invested in each property type) is an insignificant factor in explaining systematic risk.   
 
Apart from the above variables, Conover et al. (1998) provided indirect evidence for 
the role of size in systematic risk in which they found that the return and risk 
differences between large and small foreign real estate firms were statistically 
significant. Similarly, Gyuorko and Nelling (1996) examined the systematic risk of 
REITs from 1988 to 1992 and found a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between size and systematic risk. In Australia, Tan (2004) provided 
indirect evidence and showed that large size LPTs have a higher beta. Conversely, a 
more recent study from Litt et al. (1999) employed a different study period (1993-
1997) for the U.S. REIT market and showed contrary results where they presented a 
low negative correlation between size and systematic risk. Ambrose and Linneman, 
2001 and Byrne and Lee (2003) revealed similar results in which no significant size 
effect is found for U.S. REITs’ and U.K. property funds’ betas. More recently, 
Ambrose et al. (2005) re-examined and documented a significant inverse relationship 
between beta and size and they attributed this to the economies of scale in REITs.  
 
Furthermore, several studies examined the influence of the management structure of 
the LPT on its systematic risk. Capozza and Seguin (2000) demonstrated that 
externally managed REITs have higher systematic risk than self-managed REITs. 
Consistently, Allen et al. (2000) studied the impacts of management strategy on risk 
and offered evidence that self-management REITs exhibit less systematic risk. 
However, Ambrose and Linneman (2001) revealed that internally managed REITs 
have had a higher beta in recent years.  
 
In Australia, Tan (2004) examined the effect of management structure on the 
performance of Australian LPTs. The results indicated that LPTs employing an 
internal management structure outperform externally managed LPTs. Additionally, 
the results also offered some indirect evidence about the management structure effect 
on systematic risk in which externally managed LPTs show higher systematic risk. 
This is consistent with the findings from Newell and Tan (2005) for the earlier study 
period, however, they also found an increase in systematic risk for internally managed 
LPTs in recent years.     
 
2.2 Systematic Risk and Downside Systematic Risk  
 
Sharpe (1964) developed CAPM based on the Mean-Variance model which was 
developed by Markowitz (1952). It asserts that beta can be used to measure the 
systematic risk of an asset. CAPM suggests that an asset is riskier if the asset exhibits 
a higher beta. However, a higher beta can also be contributed by the upside swings of 
an asset in which it increases considerably more than the market upswing. This is not 
intuitively appealing and most investors, particularly risk relative investors, would 
probably not accept this method in measuring the systematic risk for an asset (Estrada, 
2006). 
 
Additionally, Bawa (1975) and Fishburn (1977) also highlighted the flaws in CAPM 
by assuming irrelevance of investors utility functions in asset pricing and all assets are 
normally distributed. In real estate context, the normal distribution assumption in real 
estate returns is rejected in many studies (Graff et al., 1997, Maitland-Smith and 
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Brooks, 1999, Myer and Webb, 1993, 1994, Peng, 2005). As a consequence, CAPM 
which is analysed under a non-normality distribution might provide misleading results. 
Therefore, not surprisingly, a review by Fama and French (2004) revealed that there is 
little empirical evidence in finance literature supporting CAPM.  
 
In order to obviate these limitations, Hogan and Warren (1974) and Bawa and 
Linderberg (1977) suggested using downside risk rather than variance as a risk 
measure and developed a MLPM-CAPM, which is a model that does not rely on these 
assumptions. Both studies concluded that the MLPM-CAPM model is preferred to 
CAPM at least on theoretical grounds. Harlow and Rao (1989) improved the MLPM-
CAPM model and developed a more general model, which is known as the 
Generalised Mean-Lower Partial Moment CAPM. This is a MLPM-CAPM model for 
any arbitrary benchmark return. More importantly, their empirical results support the 
use of the Generalised MLPM-CAPM model, while no similar evidence is found for 
traditional CAPM. Another important caveat from the study is that target return 
should equal to the mean of the assets’ returns rather than the risk-free rate.     
 
However, empirical tests by Jahankhani (1976) reveal little improvement for MLPM-
CAPM model over the traditional CAPM model. Besides, Nantell and Price (1979) 
revealed analytical results that variance and semi-variance produce similar 
equilibrium rates of return under the assumption of a bi-variate normal distribution of 
returns for an asset and the market. In contrast, Nantell et al. (1982) demonstrated that 
skewness in the distribution of market returns has a profound impact on CAPM in 
which a divergence of results is obtained from both MLPM-CAPM and CAPM 
models if skewness exists in the asset return distribution. Consistently, Price et al. 
(1982) showed that systematic risk in a downside risk framework is different from 
systematic risk in a mean-variance framework if the return distributions are in 
lognormal form and this supported the use of the MLPM-CAPM model.   
 
Moreover, Estrada (2000, 2002, 2004) reported significantly different results 
generated by these models and argued the superiority of using MLPM-CAPM model 
in emerging markets by providing evidence for supporting the use of downside beta 
over traditional beta. Post and Vilet (2004) also provided evidence that MLPM-
CAPM outperforms the traditional CAPM in explaining the cross-section of U.S. 
stock returns. This was confirmed by Ang et al. (2006) for U.S. stock. Fraser et al. 
(2004) also provided indirect empirical evidence from the U.K. stock market to 
support MLPM-CAPM. The results offered evidence in favourite of the CAPM in a 
bear market when there is a higher likelihood of negative returns and downside risk, 
whereas no similar result is found in a bull market. However, little, if any, the 
superiority of MLPM-CAPM in real estate evidence has been demonstrated. One 
exception is Cheng (2005) who has demonstrated the superiority of downside 
systematic risk over traditional systematic risk in explaining U.S. real estate return 
variation.  
 
The primary conclusion that can be drawn from the literature is that downside 
systematic risk appears to be a more intuitively appealing than systematic risk and it is 
distinguishable from the traditional systematic risk. Many endeavours have also 
demonstrated the link between systematic risk and financial determinants and 
management structures. However, relatively little focus has been placed on the 
relationship between downside systematic risk and these variables.   
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data  
 
The data comprise all LPTs listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) from 
1993 to 2005. This study is sub-divided into six different periods in line with the 
arguments of time-variation in systematic risk. For the purpose of reliably assessing a 
LPT’s economic and financial situation, 3-year intervals are employed in which it is 
argued that annual accounting information cannot show the real situation of a 
company (Alexander et al., 2003). The methodology is also adopted by Patel and 
Olsen (1984) and Chaudhry et al. (2004). Another reason for using 3-year interval is 
to incorporate as many LPTs as possible in the study. 106 LPTs were identified by 
using the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) and ASX Sub-Code over 
the study period.1 However, there were only 73 LPTs have adequate information over 
these 6 different study periods in line with short-lived of LPTs. Period 1 includes the 
average annual accounting information from 1993 to 1995. There were 25 LPTs that 
had sufficient accounting data for all the variables. A LPT was removed from the 
sample if it did not have complete accounting information for the period. Period 2 
spans from 1995 to 1997, Period 3 is 1997 to 1999, Period 4 is 1999 to 2001, Period 5 
is 2001-2003 and Period 6 is 2003 to 2005.  
 
Monthly returns for LPTs were obtained from Bloomberg for the corresponding 
period. Annual data for total asset (TA), long term debt (LTD), short-term debt (STD), 
Earning before Interest and Tax (EBIT), the number of common shares outstanding, 
market capitalisation and total number of traded shares were collected from 
Bloomberg and DatAnalysis. The missing data were found manually by using the 
Shares Magazine. It is a monthly magazine by ASX, which is bound with ASX 
journal. The ASX All Ordinaries Price Index is used as a benchmark and the one 
month interbank rate is employed as the risk-free rate. Both of these data sets were 
extracted from Datastream. Management structures, type of property and geographic 
characteristics for all LPTs were collected from Property Investment Research reports 
and LPT company annual reports.   
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
In the mean-variance framework, CAPM employs variance as a risk measure and it 
can be computed by: 
 [ ]2)()( iii RERVar μ−=         (1) 
 
where iR  represents return of asset i  and iμ  is the mean of the returns. 
 
The expected required return in the mean-variance framework can be displayed as 
follows: 
                                                 
1 The GICS for delisted LPTs are not necessary available via Bloomberg and DatAnalysis. Hence, 
ASX sub-code was used to identify the classification of the delisted LPTs. 
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 [ ] ifmfi RRERRE β*)()( −+=        (2) 
 
where fR is the risk-free rate of return, iβ represents beta of asset i  in which it also 
can be expressed as: 
 
)(
),(
m
mi
i RVar
RRCov=β          (3) 
 
where ),( mi RRCOV is the covariance between asset i  and market, )( mRVar  is the 
variance of the market returns.  
 
In the downside risk framework, Hogan and Warren (1974), Bawa and Linderberg 
(1977) and Harlow and Rao (1989) proposed using downside risk as the risk measure. 
Downside risk/Lower Partial Moment (LPM) is given as follows:  
 
( )[ ]{ }αμ 0,iii RMinELPM −=        (4) 
 
The Co-Lower Partial Moment (CLPM) is defined as: 
 ( ) ( )[ ]{ }0,mmfii RMinRRECLPM μ−−=       (5) 
 
where mμ  is the benchmark for market, α  is the degree of the Lower Partial Moment 
(LPM) and mR  is the market return. For consistency, the α  is equal to 2 in this study. 
It should be noted it is also known as semi-variance. 
 
The expected required return on asset i based on MLPM-CAPM is: 
 
[ ]
)(
),(
)()(
m
im
fmfi RLPM
RRCLPM
RRERRE −+=       (6) 
 
where fR is the risk-free rate of return, 
( )
)(
,
m
im
RLPM
RRCLPM
 can be simplified to the 
downside beta of asset i  ( Diβ ).  
 
Recently, Estrada (2002) formally defines downside beta as following: 
 ( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ }
( )[ ]{ }20, 0,0, mm mmiiDi RMinE
RMinRMinE
μ
μμβ −
−−=        (7) 
 
where iμ is the benchmark for asset i . 
 
In this study, the beta and downside beta for asset i were computed in the first stage of 
the analysis by using Equations (3) and (7) respectively in which the target rate for 
Equation (7) is set equal to mean of the benchmark. Thereafter, the computed beta and 
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downside beta were regressed respectively with the average accounting-based 
variables over the three-year interval and management structure by using Equation (8) 
and Equation (9).   
 
 
)(TurnoverLnPAssetBusRiskLTLeverageSTLeverage tpblsi βββββαβ +++++=  
 
        εββ +++ )()( ManagementMarketCapLn mgmtm     (8) 
 
 
)(TurnoverLnPAssetBusRiskLTLeverageSTLeverage Dt
D
p
D
b
D
l
D
s
D
i βββββαβ +++++=
 
 
        εββ +++ )()( ManagementMarketCapLn DmgmtDm     (9) 
 
where STLeverage  presents the short-term leverage of asset i ,  LTLeverage  is the 
long-term leverage of asset i , BusRisk is business risk of asset i , PAsset  is property 
asset investment of asset i , Turnover  is turnover of asset i , MarketCap is market 
capitalisation of asset i , Management  is a dummy variable with a value of 0 a 
externally managed LPT and 1 for an internally managed LPT.  
 
The definitions of the above variables are suggested by the literature as follows: 
  
a) Leverage. In this study, the ratio of total short-term debt to total assets and the 
ratio of total long-term debt to total assets are used to measure the leverage level 
of a LPT. In general, it is hypothesised that systematic risk and downside 
systematic risk are positively related to leverage ratio. 
b) Business Risk. It is measured by the ratio of total annual earnings (before interest 
and taxes) to average total assets. A negative association is expected between 
business risk and systematic risk and downside systematic risk respectively.    
c) Property asset. Property asset is measured by the ratio of total property investment 
to total assets. It is hypothesised that property asset is expected to be negatively 
related to systematic risk and downside systematic risk.  
d) Turnover. The turnover is measured by the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
average trading volume to common shares outstanding. An inverse relationship 
between turnover and systematic risk is hypothesised.  
e) Market capitalisation (size). The market capitalisation is determined by 
multiplying the total shares outstanding by the current LPT’s price. A negative 
relationship is expected between market capitalisation and systematic risk and 
downside systematic risk respectively. 
f) Management Structure. In Australia, an internal management structure permits 
LPT to engage in property development and/or fund management activities. 
Hence, it is expected that internally managed LPTs are exposured to higher 
systematic risk in both frameworks.   
 
 
(Insert Table 1) 
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Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the LPT market from the sample. Obviously, 
since the 1990s, the market has experienced a dramatic growth in which the number 
of LPTs has increased dramatically from 38 in Period 1 to 60 in Period 3. Thereafter 
the market has undergone a consolidation phase via merger and acquisition activities. 
It is evident that the number of LPTs has decreased to 37 in Period 6, whilst the 
average market capitalisation of LPTs has increased dramatically from $334 million 
in Period 1 to $1,340 million in Period 6. The growth also renewed the attention of the 
investors as there was a gradual increase in turnover until Period 6. The increased 
turnover is expected to reduce the market risk in which LPTs become more liquid.  
 
Another interesting point that can be seen in Table 1 is that the LPT market has also 
undergone some structural changes in which the debt level has increased in last 
decade in particular long-term debt. The long-term debt has increased substantially 
from an average of 7% in Period 1 to 28% in Period 6. Additionally, there is a trend 
showing a steady increase in the number of LPTs employ an internal management 
structure via the stapled security structure. Consequently, the property asset 
proportion of LPTs has decreased in recent years which it is evident in Period 5 and 6. 
These changes have further increased the sensitivity of LPTs to the market’s risk. The 
structural change in recent years is also being evident in business risk. The business 
risk of LPTs was stable in first three periods and peaked in Period 4, thereafter it 
decreased in Periods 5 and 6.  
 
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Comparison between Beta and Downside Beta  
 
The average standard deviation, downside deviation, beta and downside beta are 
presented in Table 2. Panel A in Table 2 reveals that standard deviation exhibits 
higher risk than downside deviation. The results are also consistent with the previous 
studies on downside risk framework such as Sing and Ong (2000) and Peng (2005).  
 
 
(Insert Table 2) 
 
 
Notably, the results from Panel B in Table 2 indicate the dynamics of beta in 
Australian LPTs in which it varies from 0.292 in Period 1 to 0.432 in Period 6. The 
results confirm the findings from previous studies on time variation in beta. Khoo et 
al. (1993) and Liang et al. (1995) demonstrated a decline in market beta in U.S. 
REITs from the 1970s to the end of the 1980s. Matysiak and Brown (1997) also found 
that the equity betas of eighteen U.K. property companies vary over time. 
Consistently, Newell and Tan (2005) also revealed similar results from Australian 
LPTs. Similar results are also found in Panel B Table 2 for downside beta. These 
results indicate that downside beta as well as beta varies from time to time.  
 
Interestingly, downside beta reveals that Period 4 has the highest systematic risk, 
while beta shows it has the lowest beta. This provides some indirect evidence to 
support the dissimilarity between beta and downside beta. Another interesting 
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observation from Table 2 is that downside betas are substantially higher than betas. 
Over the sample, on average, downside betas are at least 25% higher than betas. In 
other words, beta underestimates downside systematic risk. 2  This confirms the 
argument of Price et al. (1982) in which beta for the low risk sample actually 
underestimates downside systematic risk. The results are also consistent with the 
results that were found by Estrada (2002) for emerging stock markets.    
 
To reinforce the findings on the significant differences between beta and downside 
beta, t-statistics and sign-tests are conducted. For the t-statistic, it is hypothesised that 
the mean difference between beta and downside beta is equal to zero ( )0=X , while 
the alternate hypothesis is 0≠X . T-statistics can be displayed as follows: 
 
iii taDownsideBeBetaX −=        (10) 
 
nS
Xt
/
0−=          (11) 
 
where X  is the mean of iX , and S is the standard deviation of iX over the sample. 
 
A non-parametric test (sign test) is also conducted. The null hypothesis is the number 
of positive differences and negative differences are equal; whereas its alternate 
hypothesis is the numbers of positive (negative) differences are more likely. The sign 
test can be computed as following: 
 
n
nKz
5.0
5.0)5.0( −+=         (12) 
 
where K  is number of negative/positive differences, and n is number of observations. 
 
 
(Insert Table 3) 
 
 
Table 3 shows the results from t-statistics and sign-tests for the differences between 
beta and downside beta. Table 3 provides strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
of similarity of both beta and downside beta. T-statistics reveal that downside beta has 
a statistically significant difference from beta at least at the 5% level in all periods 
except Periods 1 and 6. In other words, the null hypothesis in which zero difference 
between beta and downside beta is rejected for Periods 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
 
Z-statistics also confirm previous findings and offer evidence that downside beta is 
consistently higher than beta in all periods and the null hypothesis for all periods can 
be rejected at the 1% significant level with the Z-test. All of these are consistent with 
the findings from Price et al. (1982) for U.S. stocks.  
 
                                                 
2 Most of LPTs in the sample exhibit beta and downside beta that are lower than 1. Hence, Australian 
LPTs are considered as low risk.  
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Another interesting observation from Periods 1 and 6 is the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected by t-statistic, while these are rejected by Z-statistic with 1% significant level. 
Obviously, smaller sample size could be one of the plausible explanations, while it 
cannot be the only reason account for this scenario. Another possible explanation is 
the non-normality in return distributions. 88%, 36% and 24% of the number of LPTs 
from the sample in Period 1 can be rejected by Jarque-Bera, Lillifors and Shapiro-
Wilk normality tests respectively. Similar strong normality rejection evidence is 
found for Period 6. T-statistic is a parametric test that requires normality assumption. 
On the other hand, sign-test is a non-parametric test which is liberated from this 
assumption. Hence, it is not surprisingly that Z-statistics in Table 3 reject the null 
hypothesis with statistically significant at 1%; while, no similar evidence for t-
statistics.     
 
In sum, beta and downside beta are varying from time to time and both are 
distinguishable. The important caveat from these findings is that the financial 
determinants for beta might not be suitable to explain downside beta. Therefore, it is 
crucial to examine the determinants of downside beta.   
 
4.2 Determinants of Systematic Risk 
 
Table 4A presents the regression results between beta and the financial determinants 
and LPT structures over the six different periods from Equation (8). Surprisingly, in 
Periods 1, 4 and 6, none of the variables are significant in explaining beta. Notably, 
the coefficient on turnover is significant and positive in Periods 2 and 3, suggesting 
that the higher turnover of a LPT, the riskier is the LPT in terms of systematic risk. 
This is conspicuous and inconsistent with the previous findings in U.S. REITs.  
 
 
(Insert Table 4A) 
 
 
The coefficient for market capitalisation is only negative and statistically significant 
in Period 5, suggesting that the larger size of a LPT greatly reduces the chance of 
higher market risk. In contrast, no similar significant result is found for market 
capitalisation in other periods. This is also evident in equivalent studies such as Litt et 
al. (1999) and Ambrose and Linneman (2001) for U.S. REITs and Byrne and Lee 
(2003) for U.K. property funds which show little impact from size on systematic risk. 
However, it is inconsistent with the findings from Gyuorko and Nelling (1996) and 
the indirect evidence from Tan (2004) for Australian LPTs.  
 
The results also reveal that property asset is only negatively and statistically 
significantly related to beta at 5% level in Periods 2 and 3. However, no similar 
significant evidence is found for other periods. The insignificance of the property 
asset result is consistent with the previous studies in U.S. REITs. This can be 
attributed to the little variation in property asset proportions for LPTs. In Australia, 
most of the LPTs maintain a high proportion of property asset. Hence, it is not 
surprising that this variable does not provide a good explanation for beta.  
 
Surprisingly, the results reveal that short-term debt to be positively correlated to beta 
in all periods except Period 6; while it is only significant in Period 3. Similarly, long-
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term debt has a statistically insignificant relationship with beta. These are counter to 
the results found in U.S. REITs in which there is little evidence to support the 
explanation power of leverage in Australian LPTs’ betas. The plausible explanation 
could be the relative low leverage level for Australian LPTs. As observed by Newell 
and Tan (2005), in comparison to U.S. REITs, the leverage levels for Australian’s 
LPTs generally are considered low even though there has been an increase in leverage 
levels for Australian LPTs in recent years. 
 
The results also reveal that business risk is positively linked to beta, suggesting that 
the LPTs with high business risk would have higher market risk. However, this 
variable is insignificant over all time periods. The insignificance of this variable 
contradicts to the previous studies of U.S. REITs. The lack of significance for this 
variable probably can be attributed to the little variation in the sample for this variable 
in which the median for business risk over all periods remains constant at around 7%.  
 
The management coefficient also reveals that internally managed LPTs have a higher 
beta. This is consistent with the findings from recent studies such as Ambrose and 
Linneman (2001). However, the evidence to support this factor is generally 
insignificant as it is only significant in Period 5. This provides indirect evidence to 
support the findings of Capozza and Seguin (2000) who demonstrated that the 
differences in management structure can be solely attributed to the financial risk 
(leverage). Since, no significant influence of financial risk on Australian LPTs’ betas 
is found; it is not surprising that this factor is insignificant in explaining betas.  
  
Overall, turnover and property asset have significant explanatory power in regards to 
beta. However, these explanatory powers have diminished in recent years. More 
importantly, the financial variables and management structure variables are found for 
explaining beta in U.S. REITs are not suitable for Australian LPTs.  
 
 
4.3 Determinants of Downside Systematic Risk 
 
Table 4B displays the regression results between downside beta and financial and 
LPT management structure variables from Equation (9). Conversely with the results 
for beta in general, short-term leverage reveals a strong relationship with downside 
beta. These indicate that in comparison with beta, downside beta which only focuses 
on the downside risk is more sensitive to leverage. More importantly, these significant 
results are consistent with the hypothesis, suggesting that higher leverage leads the 
greater market risk. Another interesting point is downside beta is more sensitive to 
short-term leverage than long-term leverage. 
 
 
(Insert Table 4B) 
 
 
In general, market capitalisation shows a negative relationship with downside beta. 
However, it is a significant variable in explaining downside beta in early study period 
in which market capitalisation is negatively and statistically significant being at least 
at 5% level with downside beta for Periods 1 and 4. This suggests that large LPTs can  
lower downside systematic risk and this can be attributed to the economies of scale. 
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However, the coefficient in Periods 2 and 3 are positive and it is statistically 
significant at 5% in Period 3. This is consistent with the indirect evidence from 
Newell and Tan (2005) for Australian LPTs in which their sub-period analysis shows 
that larger LPTs has higher market risk in this period.  
 
Clearly, internally managed LPTs exhibit higher downside beta than externally 
managed LPTs except for Periods 1 and 6. However, unlike beta, management 
structure is significant in explaining downside beta in Periods 2, 3 and 5. Coincidently, 
the results show that downside beta is more sensitive to leverage in comparison with 
beta. As a consequence, it is reasonable to expect that management structure has 
stronger influence on downside beta, if the findings from Capozza and Seguin (2000) 
can be generalised into a downside risk framework.   
 
An inverse relationship is evident between property asset and downside beta over all 
time periods, suggesting a higher property asset level in a LPT has a lower downside 
beta. However, property asset variable is only significant in explaining downside beta 
in Period 6. This can be largely attributed to the relatively small differences in 
property asset holdings between LPTs.  
 
Interestingly, no evidence is available to show business risk and turnover variables are 
significant over any of the periods. These results contradict the findings for beta in 
which turnover has significance explanation power to beta. On the other hand, this 
supports the alternative hypothesis of this study in which beta and downside beta 
sensitivities to financial conditions and management structure are different.  
 
In summary, leverage has significant explanation power for downside beta. Besides, 
the importance of the market capitalisation and management structure variables in 
explaining downside beta are also found. However, the size effect has diminished in 
recent years. More importantly, the explanation variables which are significant in 
explaining beta do not have similar explanatory power in downside beta. These results 
also render further support to downside systematic risk being distinguishable from 
systematic risk.   
 
 
4.4 Property Type and Geographic Specialisation 
 
Nevertheless, there are a few concerns that still need to be addressed. LPTs have 
different investment characteristics where they invest in different property types and 
different locations. The evidence from Ambrose and Linneman (2001), Byrne and Lee 
(2003) and Delcoure and Dickens (2004) suggests that beta does vary to a noticeable 
extent by controlling of these characteristics. However, Gyourko and Nelling (1996) 
and Allen et al. (2000) showed that diversification across property types and 
geographic location does not have a significant impact on diversification of 
systematic risk.  
 
To reinforce the previous findings, the investment characteristics of LPTs should be 
controlled. In this study, controlling the type of property and location by employing 
dummy variables could be a vain exercise in line with the issue of undue 
multicollinearity and small sample size especially in Period 1. Pearson correlation 
displays that office and retial sectors are strongly correlated with statistically 
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significant at least at 5% from Period 1 to Period 5. Similar mutlicolinearity issues are 
also found by Variance-inflation Factor (VIF). Moreover, strong correlation between 
New South Wales and Victoria are also evident.3 
 
Therefore, the Herfindahl-property type (or geographic) index is employed in this 
study in order to capture the differences in LPTs’ holdings and overcome the issues. 
The Herfindahl-property type (or geographic) index is given as follow: 
 
∑
=
=
N
i
i
prop
i wD
1
2          (13) 
  
∑
=
=
N
i
i
geo
i wD
1
2          (14) 
  
where N is the number of property type (or geographic) segments and iw  is the 
weight of the LPT’s investment in segment i . 4  
 
The Herfindahl-property type index is based on the 5 segments, namely, office, 
industrial, retail, leisure and others. If a LPT only specialises in the office market, the 
weight for office would be equal to one and zero for other segments; the Herfindahl-
property type index is also equal to one. A naïve property type diversification strategy 
will result in a Herfindahl-property type index of 0.2 )/1( n . Hence, propiD  value for a 
LPT will vary from 0.2 to 1 and it is subject to the level of differences in property 
types. 
 
Herfindahl-geographic index is also constructed for geographic specialisation based 
on 4 segments (New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and others). Similar to the 
Herfindahl-property type index, a greater geographic diversification for a LPT is 
reflected in a smaller Herfindahl-geographic index. On the other hand, if the LPT is 
heavily concentrated in one particular segment; the Herfindahl-property type index is 
equal to one.   
 
The Herfindahl-property type and Herfindahl-geographic indices for each LPT is 
regressed with beta in equations (15) and (16) respectively: 
  
)(TurnoverLnPAssetBusRiskLTLeverageSTLeverage tpblsi βββββαβ +++++=  
 
        εβββ ++++ propidmgmtm DManagementMarketCapLn )()(   (15) 
 
)(TurnoverLnPAssetBusRiskLTLeverageSTLeverage tpblsi βββββαβ +++++=  
 
        εβββ ++++ geoidmgmtm DManagementMarketCapLn )()(   (16) 
 
 
                                                 
3 The results are available from authors upon on request 
4 See Gyourko and Nelling (1996) for details. 
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Next, the Herfindahl-property type and Herfindahl-geographic indices for each LPT is 
also further regressed with downside beta in equations (17) and (18) respectively: 
 
)(TurnoverLnPAssetBusRiskLTLeverageSTLeverage Dt
D
p
D
b
D
l
D
s
D
i βββββαβ +++++=
 
 
        εβββ ++++ propiDdDmgmtDm DManagementMarketCapLn )()(   (17) 
 
)(TurnoverLnPAssetBusRiskLTLeverageSTLeverage Dt
D
p
D
b
D
l
D
s
D
i βββββαβ +++++=  
 
        εβββ ++++ geoiDdDmgmtDm DManagementMarketCapLn )()(   (18) 
 
 
where STLeverage  presents the short-term leverage of asset i ,  LTLeverage  is the 
long-term leverage of asset i , BusRisk is business risk of asset i , PAsset  is property 
asset investment of asset i , Turnover  is turnover of asset i , MarketCap is market 
capitalisation of asset i , Management  is a dummy variable with a value of 0 for an 
externally managed LPT and 1 for an internally managed LPT, propiD  is Herfindahl-
property type index and geoiD is Herfindahl-geographic index.  
 
 
(Insert Table 5A) 
 
 
In general, the regression results from Equation (15) are reported in Table 5A and the 
results are similar to the baseline results that are found in Table 4A. Clearly, there is 
no considerable variation observed in comparing it to Table 4A in which the evidence 
to support property asset and turnover are only significant in the early study period. 
Little evidence is available to support other variables having a strong explanatory 
power for systematic risk. Importantly, these findings corroborate the findings from 
Table 4A. The lack of variation between the results and the previous results is not 
surprising given the relatively low impact of the degree of specification in property 
type on systematic risk. 
 
The results are further examined using Herfindahl-geographic index. Table 5B reports 
the regression results with beta and the determinants and Herfindahl-geographic index 
from Equation (16).  
 
 
(Insert Table 5B) 
 
 
Generally, the results reveal that LPTs specialising in a particular location exhibit a 
lower systematic risk. However, a marginal effect of the degree of geographic 
specialisation on systematic risk is found in which is only significant at 5% in Period 
2. Therefore, little alteration is evident on the baseline results and the previous results 
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are considered to be quite consistent even after considering the degree of geographic 
concentration.  
 
Similarly, the previous results for downside systematic risk are reinforced by further 
regressing with the degree of property-type specialisation with Equation (17). The 
results are reported in Table 6A.  
 
 
(Insert Table 6A) 
 
 
Consistently, no substantial difference is found from Table 6A for downside 
systematic risk in comparison to Table 4B. The significance of leverage is consistent 
with the results from Table 4B even after controlling for the degree of concentration 
in property type. Additionally, the significant explanatory power of market 
capitalisation and management structure are also evident. The insignificance of other 
variables is also found.   
 
 
(Insert Table 6B) 
 
 
Table 6B exhibits the regression results between downside systematic risk and its 
determinants and degree of geographic specialisation from Equation (18). An 
insignificant coefficient on the Herfindahl-geographic index suggests no 
indispensable effect from the degree of concentration in location on downside 
systematic risk. The result indicates that neither LPTs heavily concentrated in a 
particular location nor LPTs diversified by location are unable to considerably lower 
the downside systematic risk. Most of variables reveal results that corroborate the 
results from Table 4B once the geographic specialisation of LPTs is controlled.  
 
The baselines are also further examined the impact of different target rate on 
downside beta. Risk-free rate and zero rate of return are other common used cut-off 
points in downside risk analysis. Hence, the downside beta is first further measured 
with risk-free rate )( −rfβ  and second measured by zero rate of return )( 0−β . The 
correlations results among different downside beta measures are showed in Table 7.   
 
 
(Insert Table7) 
 
 
Table 7 exhibits that the previous results do not change with the way of estimating 
asymmetries in betas. More specifically, the results are robust to using different target 
rate of returns. Obviously, −β , −rfβ  and −0β are all strongly correlated with each other 
over all time periods with correlation greater than 0.75. These downside beta 
measures even exhibit stronger correlation results in Periods 1, 4, 5 and 6. Given these 
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strong correlations, it is not surprisingly that no evidence to support these different 
target rate returns change the baselines results in Table 4B considerably.5     
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In recent years, the use of CAPM and beta have been widely criticised in the literature. 
In this study, MLPM-CAPM and downside systematic risk have been employed in 
analysing Australian LPTs and three noteworthy results are found. First, consistent 
with the previous empirical evidence; downside systematic risk and traditional 
systematic risk in Australian LPTs are distinguishable. Second, although, turnover 
and property asset reveal some explanatory power for Australian LPT’s beta, these 
explanatory powers have diminished in recent years. Thus, little evidence is found for 
the link between systematic risk and financial variables and management structure. 
More importantly, there is little evidence to suggest that these variables in the same 
manner that U.S. REITs could explain Australian LPTs’ betas. Third, a strong 
relationship between downside systematic risk and leverage, management structure 
and market capitalisation were found. However, a decline trend for the explanatory 
power of size in recent years is also evident. These results also provided further 
evidence of the dissimilarity between systematic risk and downside systematic risk in 
which systematic risk and downside systematic risk sensitivities to financial 
determinants and management structure are dissimilar.  
 
The important practical implication from this study is that more rigid interpretation 
from investors and real estate analysts is required with reference to the higher returns 
from high leverage and internal managed LPTs. There is little evidence that these high 
returns appear to be compensation for the greater systematic risk; these returns could 
for rewarding downside systematic risk in line with different traits for both downside 
and traditional systematic risks. Considering the limitations surrounding the relatively 
small number of LPTs in Australian LPTs, future research should extend this study by 
employing a market with larger number of LPTs in order to more accurately measure 
the implications of the financial variables to downside systematic risk. The additional 
variables should also be considered for the purpose of increasing the explanation 
power of the models.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Period Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 
Total Number 
of LPTs  
38 54 60 41 46 37 
Number of 
LPTs in the 
Sample 
25 34 42 31 32 27 
Short-term 
debt/ Total 
Asset (%) 
0.382 1.320 2.103 2.766 4.691 4.140 
Long-term 
debt/ Total 
Asset (%) 
7.185 13.326 19.918 24.951 26.251 28.038 
Business Risk 
(%) 
6.639 6.847 6.281 9.827 7.168 7.526 
Property 
Asset (%) 
77.700 85.940 87.670 88.259 85.383 80.268 
Turnover (%) 20.822 28.227 34.432 36.641 48.897 49.530 
Market 
Capitalisation 
(in million) 
334.424 430.610 536.847 827.639 1,225.999 1,399.938
Management 
Structure (%) 
16.000 14.706 16.667 19.355 25.000 37.037 
Note: Period 1 (1993-1995); Period 2 (1995-1997), Period 3 (1997-1999), Period 4 (1999-
2001), Period 5 (2001-2003) and Period 6 (2003-2005). All figures are the average of all 
LPTs over the sample. Management structure shows the percentage of LPTs employing as 
internal management structure.   
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Table 2: Riskiness and Beta and Downside Beta in Australian LPTs  
Period  Standard Deviation Downside Deviation 
Panel A 
Period 1 0.144 0.038 
Period 2 0.054 0.029 
Period 3 0.076 0.037 
Period 4 0.086 0.041 
Period 5 0.061 0.033 
Period 6 0.090 0.033 
Panel B 
Period Beta Downside Beta 
Period 1 0.292 0.544 
Period 2 0.399 0.585 
Period 3 0.498 0.620 
Period 4 0.283 0.674 
Period 5 0.356 0.511 
Period 6 0.432 0.562 
Note: The figures are the average of standard deviation, downside deviation, beta and 
downside beta over the sample. 
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Table 3: Comparison between Beta and Downside Beta 
Period T-statistics Z-statistics 
Period 1 -0.741 4.000** 
Period 2 -17.174** 5.659** 
Period 3 -2.584* 3.549** 
Period 4 -4.994** 4.670** 
Period 5 -3.695** 3.712** 
Period 6 -0.650 4.234** 
Note: * indicates significant at 5% and ** indicates significant at 1%. 
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Table 4A: Regressions between Beta and Financial Variables and Management 
Structure 
Period  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 
Constant 9.130 
(1.159) 
1.671 
(1.608) 
1.001 
(1.116) 
4.583 
(1.788) 
3.429 
(2.615) 
0.958 
(0.248) 
Short-term 
Debt/Total 
Debt 
36.499 
(0.700) 
1.065 
(0.540) 
5.726 
(4.479)** 
0.497 
(0.160) 
1.111 
(1.377) 
-3.736 
(-0.937) 
Long-term 
Debt/Total 
Debt 
-2.614 
(-0.585) 
0.173 
(0.525) 
-0.243 
(-0.715) 
-0.868 
(-0.676) 
0.097 
(0.150) 
2.479 
(1.582) 
Business Risk 22.966 
(1.075) 
1.725 
(0.561) 
1.731 
(0.522) 
0.119 
(0.214) 
0.162 
(0.124) 
0.678 
(0.151) 
Property 
Asset 
-0.003 
(-0.001) 
-0.650 
(-2.259)* 
-0.854 
(-2.496)* 
-1.311 
(-0.986) 
-0.021 
(-0.046) 
-0.055 
(-0.035) 
Ln(Turnover) 0.763 
(1.052) 
0.219 
(3.337)** 
0.204 
(3.493)** 
0.097 
(0.451) 
0.112 
(1.532) 
0.120 
(0.404) 
Ln(Market 
Cap) 
-0.485 
(-1.206) 
-0.028 
(-0.574) 
0.016 
(0.363) 
-0.146 
(-1.320) 
-0.148 
(-2.843)** 
-0.063 
(-0.407) 
Management 
Structure 
0.971 
(0.900) 
0.108 
(0.917) 
0.129 
(1.170) 
0.063 
(0.199) 
0.369 
(2.841)** 
0.832 
(1.670) 
R2 (%) 0.178 0.468 0.656 0.128 0.641 0.333 
F-statistics 0.527 3.270* 9.249** 0.480 6.124** 1.357 
Note: * indicates significant at 5% and ** indicates significant at 1%. The correlation 
matrix (bivariate multicollinearity assessment) and variance-inflation factor 
(multivariate multicollinearity assessment) do not reveal the issue of undue 
multicollinearity. 
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Table 4B: Regressions between Downside Beta and Financial Variables and 
Management Structure 
Period  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 
Constant 3.116 
(3.357) 
0.810 
(1.020) 
-0.151 
(-0.231) 
6.093 
(3.312) 
2.611 
(1.658) 
1.668 
(2.202) 
Short-term 
Debt/Total Debt 
5.662 
(0.921) 
3.748 
(2.488)* 
2.667 
(2.865)** 
0.198 
(0.089) 
2.542 
(2.487)* 
1.912 
(2.447)* 
Long-term 
Debt/Total Debt 
0.493 
(0.937) 
0.300 
(1.193) 
-0.282 
(-1.140) 
0.107 
(0.116) 
1.213 
(1.475) 
1.126 
(3.670)** 
Business Risk 3.496 
(1.389) 
-4.206 
(-1.792) 
-1.530 
(-0.633) 
0.183 
(0.457) 
-0.843 
(-0.510) 
-0.181 
(-0.206) 
Property Asset -0.013 
(0.043) 
-0.093 
(-0.422) 
-0.431 
(-1.731) 
-1.912 
(-2.003) 
-0.172 
(-0.304) 
-0.885 
(-2.912)** 
Ln(Turnover) 0.156 
(1.829) 
0.056 
(1.118) 
-0.431 
(-1.731) 
0.038 
(0.244) 
0.084 
(0.908) 
0.114 
(1.958) 
Ln(Market Cap) -0.136 
(-2.867)* 
0.006 
(0.150) 
0.062 
(2.776)* 
-0.192 
(-2.424)* 
-0.118 
(-1.788) 
-0.031 
(-1.043) 
Management 
Structure 
-0.140 
(-1.098) 
0.234 
(2.590)* 
0.223 
(2.776)** 
0.098 
(0.430) 
0.401 
(2.439)* 
-0.055 
(-0.562) 
R2 (%) 0.409 0.422 0.484 0.412 0.675 0.546 
F-statistics 1.678 2.711* 4.563** 2.299* 7.116** 3.261* 
Note: * indicates significant at 5% and ** indicates significant at 1%. The correlation 
matrix (bivariate multicollinearity assessment) and variance-inflation factor 
(multivariate multicollinearity assessment) do not reveal the issue of undue 
multicollinearity. 
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Table 5A: Regressions between Beta and Financial Variables and Management 
Structure by Controlling Property Type Specialisation 
Period Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 
Constant 9.001 
(1.064) 
1.958 
(1.767) 
0.138 
(0.141) 
4.368 
(1.551) 
3.185 
(2.310) 
3.864 
(0.935) 
Short-term 
Debt/Total 
Debt 
37.972 
(0.631) 
0.794 
(0.394) 
5.486 
(4.421)** 
0.604 
(0.188) 
1.103 
(1.335) 
-4.075 
(-1.062) 
Long-term 
Debt/Total 
Debt 
-2.683 
(-0.561) 
0.253 
(0.730) 
-0.371 
(-1.107) 
-0.896 
(-0.680) 
0.093 
(0.141) 
2.371 
(1.574) 
Business Risk 22.778 
(1.022) 
1.850 
(0.597) 
0.382 
(0.116) 
0.113 
(0.199) 
0.160 
(0.120) 
0.752 
(0.175) 
Property 
Asset 
0.051 
(0.019) 
-0.625 
(-2.144)* 
-0.887 
(-2.681)* 
-1.380 
(-0.987) 
-0.033 
(-0.071) 
0.410 
(0.270) 
Ln(Turnover) 0.761 
(1.016) 
0.227 
(3.399)** 
0.166 
(2.757)* 
0.085 
(0.369) 
0.109 
(1.339) 
0.193 
(0.665) 
Ln(Market 
Cap) 
-0.484 
(-1.166) 
-0.038 
(-0.745) 
0.050 
(1.099) 
-0.138 
(-1.166) 
-0.146 
(-2.571)* 
-0.155 
(-0.982) 
Management 
Structure 
0.973 
(0.874) 
0.084 
(0.682) 
0.144 
(1.347) 
0.077 
(0.232) 
0.370 
(2.784)* 
0.501 
(0.962) 
Herfindahl –
Property Type 
Index 
0.099 
(0.054) 
-0.148 
(-0.791) 
0.353 
(1.865) 
0.130 
(0.207) 
0.030 
(0.119) 
-1.438 
(-1.606) 
R2 (%) 0.178 0.481 0.689 0.129 0.641 0.417 
F-statistics 0.434 2.898** 9.118** 0.408 5.140** 1.609 
Note: * indicates significant at 5% and ** indicates significant at 1%. The correlation 
matrix (bivariate multicollinerity assessment) and variance-inflation factor 
(multivariate multicollinearity assessment) do not reveal the issue of undue 
multicollinearity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13th Pacific Rim Real Estate Society Conference, Fremantle, Western Australia Lee, Robinson and Reed 
 25
Table 5B: Regressions between Beta and Financial Variables and Management 
Structure by Controlling Geographic Specialisation  
Period Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 
Constant 10.370 
(1.089) 
2.364 
(2.368) 
0.386 
(0.336) 
5.257 
(1.838) 
4.760 
(3.027) 
1.775 
(0.320) 
Short-term 
Debt/Total 
Debt 
36.784 
(0.685) 
1.475 
(0.810) 
5.663 
(4.406)** 
1.345 
(0.386) 
0.731 
(0.885) 
-4.099 
(-0.924) 
Long-term 
Debt/Total 
Debt 
-2.367 
(-0.503) 
-0.175 
(-0.522) 
-0.282 
(-0.819) 
-0.827 
(-0.634) 
-0.256 
(-0.380) 
2.217 
(1.093) 
Business Risk 22.637 
(1.028) 
1.158 
(0.408) 
2.505 
(0.726) 
0.072 
(0.126) 
0.130 
(0.102) 
0.834 
(0.179) 
Property 
Asset 
-0.319 
(-0.112) 
-0.468 
(-1.702) 
-0.792 
(-2.256)* 
-1.209 
(-0.888) 
0.241 
(0.551) 
-0.090 
(-0.056) 
Ln(Turnover) 0.700 
(0.886) 
0.132 
(1.874) 
0.199 
(3.367)** 
0.089 
(0.405) 
0.185 
(2.146)* 
0.123 
(0.402) 
Ln(Market 
Cap) 
-0.526 
(-1.180) 
-0.056 
(-1.204) 
0.036 
(0.734) 
-0.176 
(-1.419) 
-0.215 
(-3.187)** 
-0.089 
(-0.441) 
Management 
Structure 
0.922 
(0.817) 
0.072 
(0.658) 
0.150 
(1.323) 
0.038 
(0.118) 
0.385 
(3.032)** 
0.812 
(1.563) 
Herfindahl-
Geographical 
Index 
-0.504 
(-0.249) 
-0.619 
(-2.397)* 
0.220 
(0.862) 
-0.373 
(-0.568) 
-0.419 
(-1.507) 
-0.301 
(-0.211) 
R2 (%) 0.181 0.568 0.663 0.140 0.673 0.335 
F-statistics 0.443 4.102** 8.125** 0.448 5.926** 1.133 
Note: * indicates significant at 5% and ** indicates significant at 1%. The correlation 
matrix (bivariate multicollinerity assessment) and variance-inflation factor 
(multivariate multicollinearity assessment) do not reveal the issue of undue 
multicollinearity. 
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Table 6A: Regressions between Downside Beta and Financial Variables and 
Management Structure by Controlling Property Type Specialisation 
Period  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 
Constant 3.014 
(3.037) 
1.136 
(1.362) 
-0.156 
(-0.207) 
6.287 
(3.112) 
2.925 
(1.681) 
1.029 
(1.295) 
Short-term 
Debt/Total Debt 
6.831 
(0.967) 
3.441 
(2.268)* 
2.666 
(2.806)** 
0.102 
(0.044) 
2.579 
(2.474)* 
1.986 
(2.694)* 
Long-term 
Debt/Total Debt 
0.438 
(0.782) 
0.391 
(1.498) 
-0.283 
(-1.102) 
0.133 
(0.140) 
1.233 
(1.472) 
1.150 
(3.972)** 
Business Risk 3.346 
(0.782) 
-4.064 
(-1.743) 
-1.538 
(-0.612) 
0.188 
(0.460) 
-0.831 
(-0.495) 
-0.197 
(0.238) 
Property Asset 0.030 
(0.094) 
-0.064 
(-0.293) 
-0.431 
(-1.703) 
-1.850 
(-1.843) 
-0.111 
(-0.189) 
-0.988 
(-3.383)** 
Ln(Turnover) 0.155 
(1.760) 
0.066 
(1.312) 
-0.004 
(-0.086) 
0.049 
(0.300) 
0.102 
(1.002) 
0.098 
(1.765) 
Ln(Market Cap) -0.135 
(-2.769)* 
-0.005 
(-0.142) 
0.062 
(1.799) 
-0.199 
(-2.339)* 
-0.130 
(-1.809) 
-0.011 
(-0.357) 
Management 
Structure 
-0.138 
(-1.060) 
0.206 
(2.228)* 
0.223 
(2.728)** 
0.086 
(0.360) 
0.398 
(2.374)* 
0.018 
(0.180) 
Herfindahl Index 
for Property Type 
0.079 
(0.368) 
-0.167 
(-1.189) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
-0.117 
(-0.261) 
-0.144 
(-0.462) 
0.317 
(1.840) 
R2 (%) 0.417 0.453 0.484 0.413 0.678 0.618 
F-statistics 1.410 2.587* 3.875** 1.939 6.049** 3.634* 
Note: * indicates significant at 5% and ** indicates significant at 1%. The correlation 
matrix (bivariate multicollinerity assessment) and variance-inflation factor 
(multivariate multicollinearity assessment) do not reveal the issue of undue 
multicollinearity. 
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Table 6B: Regressions between Downside Beta and Financial Variables and 
Management Structure by Controlling Geographic Specialisation  
Period  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 
Constant 3.323 
(2.969) 
0.800 
(0.945) 
0.157 
(0.187) 
6.011 
(2.907) 
3.871 
(1.890) 
1.866 
(01.720) 
Short-term 
Debt/Total 
Debt 
5.709 
(0.905) 
3.742 
(2.425)* 
2.699 
(2.866)* 
0.095 
(0.038) 
2.225 
(2.070)* 
1.824 
(2.100)* 
Long-term 
Debt/Total 
Debt 
0.534 
(0.966) 
0.305 
(1.073) 
-0.263 
(-1.043) 
0.102 
(0.108) 
0.919 
(1.046) 
1.063 
(2.675)* 
Business Risk 3.441 
(1.329) 
-4.198 
(-1.747) 
-1.917 
(-0.759) 
0.188 
(0.456) 
-0.870 
(-0.525) 
-0.143 
(-0.157) 
Property 
Asset 
-0.065 
(-0.195) 
-0.095 
(-0.409) 
-0.462 
(-1.799) 
-1.925 
(-1.954) 
0.046 
(0.075) 
-0.894 
(-2.851)* 
Ln(Turnover) 0.146 
(1.571) 
0.057 
(0.961) 
-0.001 
(-0.023) 
0.039 
(0.244) 
0.145 
(1.291) 
0.115 
(1.918) 
Ln(Market 
Cap) 
-0.143 
(-2.721)* 
0.006 
(0.153) 
0.052 
(1.439) 
-0.189 
(-2.100)* 
-0.174 
(-1.978) 
-0.038 
(-0.955) 
Management 
Structure 
-0.148 
(-1.115) 
0.235 
(2.521)* 
0.213 
(2.558)* 
0.101 
(0.429) 
0.415 
(2.508)* 
-0.060 
(-0.586) 
Herfindahl 
Index for 
Geographical 
-0.084 
(-0.352) 
0.009 
(0.042) 
-0.110 
(-0.589) 
0.045 
(0.095) 
-0.350 
(-0.965) 
-0.073 
(-0.261) 
R2 (%) 0.413 0.422 0.490 0.414 0.687 0.547 
F-statistics 1.408 2.281 3.959** 1.926 6.325** 2.722* 
Note: * indicates significant at 5% and ** indicates significant at 1%. The correlation 
matrix (bivariate multicollinerity assessment) and variance-inflation factor 
(multivariate multicollinearity assessment) do not reveal the issue of undue 
multicollinearity.  
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Table 7: Correlations between Different Downside Beta Measures 
Period −β  −rfβ  −0β  
Period 1    
−β  1.000   
−
rfβ  0.998 1.000  
−
0β  0.991 0.998 1.000 
Period 2    
−β  1.000   
−
rfβ  0.756 1.000  
−
0β  0.984 0.753 1.000 
Period 3    
−β  1.000   
−
rfβ  0.801 1.000  
−
0β  0.993 0.784 1.000 
Period 4    
−β  1.000   
−
rfβ  0.980 1.000  
−
0β  0.996 0.979 1.000 
Period 5    
−β  1.000   
−
rfβ  0.967 1.000  
−
0β  1.000 0.967 1.000 
Period 6    
−β  1.000   
−
rfβ  0.938 1.000  
−
0β  0.937 0.934 1.000 
 
 
 
